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RIGHT OF A SEAMAN TO TRIAL BY JURY OF A
MAINTENANCE AND CURE CLAIM JOINED TO
A JONES ACT CLAIM-A DISCUSSION OF
FITZGERALD v. UNITED STATES LINES
It is startling that as late as the seventh decade of the twentieth century
a controversy should exist as to whether the joinder of the traditional admiralty remedy of maintenance and cure with a claim of negligence under the
Jones Act1 entitles a seaman to a jury trial on both issues. Many courts have
held that both issues may go to the jury. 2 On the other hand, several courts
have held that the maintenance and cure claim may not go to the jury;
rather the same judge who presided over the action at law under the Jones
Act, which gives the seaman a right to trial by jury, becomes an admiralty
judge and decides the maintenance and cure issue by himself.3 In Fitzgerald
v. United States Lines,4 decided in June of 1963, the Supreme Court finally
resolved the issue in favor of jury trial of both claims. This Case Note will
address itself to two questions presented by the Fitzgerald decision: first, to
what extent is the rule of the case a departure from the procedure followed by
lower courts in the past; and, second, was the Court justified in establishing
the rule by judicial decision.
In Fitzgerald, the appellant's intestate had sued, in the same complaint,
for damages for negligence under the Jones Act, for damages based on unseaworthiness of the ship, and for maintenance and cure. The plaintiff demanded a jury trial of all three issues. The trial judge granted a jury trial
on the first two counts but held the maintenance and cure issue in abeyance,
to try himself, after jury trial of the Jones Act and unseaworthiness issues.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the court, after hearing
some additional testimony, awarded the plaintiff a small amount for maintenance and cure. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
1. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
2. E.g., Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Bay State Dredging
Co. v. Porter, 153 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1946) ; cf. Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d

486 (2d Cir. 1953).

3. E.g., B. &. C. Fishing Co. v. Amirault, 292 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Mullen v.
Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 191 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342

U.S. 888 (1951).
4. 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
5. Id. at 17. The amount awarded was $224.
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affirmed. 6 Four judges held that it would have been improper to submit a
maintenance and cure claim to the jury; two concurring judges felt that the
decision to let the maintenance and cure issue go to the jury was within the
discretion of the trial judge; and three dissenting judges believed that a seaman should be entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial of a maintenance
and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim when both claims arose out of
the same set of facts. Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court held
that a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim must be submitted to the jury when both claims arose out of one set of facts. 7 Mr. Justice
Harlan, though "wholly in sympathy with the result reached by the Court,"
dissented on the ground that the rule established by the decision was procedural and, therefore, should have been established by revision of the General Rules of Admiralty Procedure through the Judicial Conference of the
8
United States, rather than by a decision of the Court.
THE STATE OF THE LAW

PRIOR TO THE FITZGERALD DECISION

Conflicting considerations are prominent in the controversy as to whether
a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim should be per-

mitted to go to the jury. On the one hand, there is the very practical consideration that to some extent a jury's Jones Act verdict may include items
also recoverable under maintenance and cure.9 The difficulty of ascertaining
what, if any, elements of maintenance and cure were included in the jury's
Jones Act verdict, and whether these items were diminished because of a
finding of contributory negligence, have made more than one judge throw
up his hands in despair and submit the entire case to the jury. 10 The difficulty
of estimating what the jury did was the main reason for the Supreme Court's
holding in Fitzgerald." On the other hand, maintenance and cure is a remedy
founded on the general maritime law.' 2 Many courts have taken the position
that, like other suits in admiralty, actions to recover maintenance and cure
should be tried before a judge sitting without a jury, simply because main3
tenance and cure is a traditional admiralty remedy.'
6. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962).
7. 374 U.S. at 21. The Court took note of the fact that, on remand, only the
maintenance and cure count would be retried. Id. at 21-22.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957); cf. Stendze v. The
Boat Neptune, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass. 1955).
10.

See Jenkins v. Roderick, supra note 9, at 304-06.

11. 374 U.S. at 18-20.
12. See generally GILMORE &
13.

BLACK, ADMIRALTY

253-62 (1957).

E.g., Miller v. Standard Oil Co., 199 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,

345 U.S. 945 (1953) ; O'Brien v. United States Tank Ship Corp., 16 F. Supp. 478, 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), where the court quoted from Marshall, C. J., in The Sarah, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1923) :
In all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury. In cases of admiralty and
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This argument is not entirely convincing. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, while granting the district courts "exclusive original cognizance of
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," saved "to suitors,
in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it."u 4 The effect of the "saving to suitors" clause is that any
action which could be brought in personam in admiralty may alternatively
be brought in a state court, or if the parties are citizens of different states and
the requisite jurisdictional amount is present on the law side of a federal
district court.15 In Leon v. Galceran,'6 decided shortly after the Civil War,
the Supreme Court held that seamen could sue in a state court for wages due
them. Although the Court said nothing about the propriety of trial by jury
in the state court action, it would seem logical that, if a party may sue on a
maritime claim in a state court, he may have the issues of fact tried by a jury,
just as he may in other actions to recover money damages in state courts. In
1885 the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a trial court decision sending
to the jury the issue of whether the master of the plaintiff's ship had breached
his duty to provide proper care to the injured plaintiff.1 7 This action could
clearly have been brought on the admiralty side of a federal district court
as a libel to recover maintenance and cure. In several other states the issues
of fact in actions at law to recover maintenance and cure have gone to
juries.' 8 There appear to be no cases in which a seaman suing in a state court
for maintenance and cure was required to try his case before a judge sitting
without a jury. There also seems to be no judicial dissent from the proposition that, where diversity of citizenship exists and the jurisdictional amount
is in controversy, an action for maintenance and cure may be tried by a jury
on the law side of a federal district court. 9 Thus, the main argument against
maritime jurisdiction, it has been settled, . . .that the trial is to be by the
court.
Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are
as distinct from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals, and
can no more be blended, than a court of chancery with a court of common law.
This passage was typical of the attitude of legal thinking in the early nineteenth
century. At that time procedural merger of an action at law with a suit in equity, or of
an action at law with a libel in admiralty, was unheard of. It is, however, rather surprising
to see the same passage quoted with reverence almost eighty years after the Field Code
had led the way to the abolition of separate courts of equity in many states, including
the state in which the federal court cited above sat.
14. 128 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
15. GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 33.
16. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 188 (1871).
17. Danvir v. Morse, 139 Mass. 323, 1 N.E. 123 (1885).
18. E.g., Corella v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 101 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) ; Falk v. Thurlow, 114 Misc. 586, 187 N.Y. Supp. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd
mem., 196 N.Y. Supp. 925 (App. Div. 1922). See also Keough v. Cefalo, 330 Mass.
57, 110 N.E.2d 919 (1953).
19. See the following in which at least the issue of damages was submitted to the
jury: Moyle v. National Petroleum Transp. Corp., 150 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Morrow
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allowing a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim to go
to the jury loses most of its force. Any violence that might be done to traditional concepts of the exclusive jurisdiction and peculiar procedure of the ad20
miralty courts has already been done by the "saving to suitors" clause.
Moreover, as has frequently been pointed out, law courts trying admiralty
2
causes of action are required to apply the federal maritime law. '
However, relatively few actions are brought at law for maintenance and
cure alone, either in the state courts or at law in the federal courts. For one
thing, maintenance and cure claims are generally smaller than the amount re22
quired to establish jurisdiction in a diversity action in a federal court.
Furthermore, the seaman's need for maintenance and cure arises, more often
than not, from either the negligence of the shipowner or his agents, actionable under the Jones Act, or breach of the shipowner's duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship. Therefore, in most suits by seamen against their employers,
three claims are joined in the same action, namely, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and negligence under the Jones Act. At this point it seems
advisable to discuss briefly problems arising from the joinder of an unseaworthiness claim with a Jones Act claim for negligence.
Although both unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure are claims
based on general maritime law, a Jones Act-unseaworthiness joinder involves
different problems than a Jones Act-maintenance and cure joinder. The cause
of action and damages for breach of the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy
ship overlap the Jones Act elements to a greater extent than is the case with
maintenance and cure. 23 The weight of authority today is that a seaman need
24
not elect between unseaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act,
but if he intends to sue on both grounds, he must sue simultaneously. 25 The
vast weight of authority is that an unseaworthiness count joined with a
26
Jones Act count may be submitted to the jury.
v. Point Towing Co., 187 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Neville v. American Barge
Line Co., 182 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Thornes v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.,
37 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
21. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, Inc., 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
22. GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 266.
23. "[R]ecovery for personal injuries for unseaworthiness has practically swallowed
Jones Act negligence, which remains only as a convenient tag upon which to ground
jurisdiction 'at law' and trial by jury as granted in the statute." Clark, J., dissenting
in Fitzgerald, 306 F.2d 461, 475 (2d Cir. 1962).
24. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, § 6-23.
25. E.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
26. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1960) ; Williams v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 960 (1956) ; Claudio v. Sinclair Refining Co., 160 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y.
1958). But see Jesonis v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 238 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1956).
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Election between maintenance and cure and the Jones Act has never
been requiredY7 Moreover, a recovery2 8 or settlement 29 of a Jones Act claim

does not bar a later assertion of a maintenance and cure claim. In a large
number of cases, including Fitzgerald, the maintenance and cure issue has
been reserved for decision by the court.3 0 However, the courts of at least
seven states permit submission of both Jones Act and maintenance and cure
counts to the jury. 31

In the federal courts, the question of trial by jury of the maritime claim
was, until recently, intertwined with the problem of pendent jurisdiction. Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 3 2 the circuit courts of appeal were divided on the question ot
whether the law side of a federal district court had jurisdiction of a maintenance and cure claim joined to a Jones Act claim. Those circuits which held
that the law side of the district court had jurisdiction of the maritime claim
also held that the joined claim could be submitted to the jury. Although a
detailed discussion of the problem of pendent jurisdiction is beyond the scope
of this Note, a brief summary of the career of the theory on a circuit basis
is desirable to place the problem of jury trial in perspective.
In Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp.,3 3 decided in 1940, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that joinder on the law
side was proper. Although the Nolan court did not rule specifically on the
right to a jury trial of the maintenance and cure claim, Bay State Dredging
3 4
Co. v. Porter,
decided six years later, held that the issue of damages on the
maintenance and cure claim was properly submitted to the jury. One year

27. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
28. Stendze v. The Boat Neptune, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass. 1955). However,
a Jones Act recovery which obviously includes elements of maintenance and cure may
bar subsequent recovery of maintenance and cure, depending on whether the plaintiff
has the burden of proof on the issue of duplication of damages.
29. Brinkman v. Oil Transfer Corp., 185 Misc. 257, 56 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
30. E.g., Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1961); Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1960).
31. See Pearson v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 223 P.2d 669 (Cal. App. 1950)
Corella v. McCormick Shipping Co., 101 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (semble)
Fegon v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 196 La. 541, 199 So. 635 (1940), modified, 198 La.
312, 3 So. 2d 632 (1941) ; Brannan v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 253 Minn. 28,
91 N.W.2d 166 (1958) (semble); Dwyer v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 131 N.J.L. 1, 34
A.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 131 N.J.L. 485, 37 A.2d 88 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944) ;
Compton v. Hammond Lumber Co., 153 Ore. 546, 58 P.2d 235 (1936), cert. dcnied, 299
U.S. 578 (1936); Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352 (1951).
32. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). For an excellent and rather caustic analysis of the
decision see Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case,
27 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1959).
33. 112 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1940).
34. 153 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1946).
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after Porter, Judge Wyzanski, in McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Co.,3 5
noted that he and his brother district judges had generally permitted joinder
on the law side with trial by jury, but held that they had erred in so doing. In
reasoning that was later adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, 36 Judge Wyzanski rejected the theory of pendent jurisdiction, on the ground that, whereas the Jones Act claim sounds in tort, maintenance and cure is quasi-contractual in nature. 37 In Doucette v. Vincent, 33
decided in 1952, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that even in
the absence of diversity of citizenship a district court had jurisdiction on the
law side of a maintenance and cure claim joined to a Jones Act claim and
that the seaman was entitled to a jury trial on both counts. Thereafter, Judge
40
39
Wyzanski in Jenkins v. Roderick, without citing his opinion in McDonald,
entered into an exhaustive discussion of the difficulties besetting the trial
judge who sent the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims to the jury and
then attempted to compute how much he should award for maintenance and
cure; Judge Wyzanski concluded that he would submit all three issues to the
jury. In two other cases decided in the First Circuit before Romero,4' joined
42
maintenance and cure claims were submitted to the jury.
In Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co.,43 decided in 1953, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled, apparently without considering
the abstract question of whether a maintenance and cure issue should be
submitted to the jury at all, that it was proper to submit an issue of fact 44
involved with a maintenance and cure claim to the jury. Two years later,
Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha4 held that, absent diversity
of citizenship, a district court lacked jurisdiction on the law side over an
unseaworthiness claim joined to a Jones Act claim. Apparently, no cases
involving joinder of a maintenance and cure claim and a Jones Act claim
came before the Second Circuit before the Romero case 46 had been decided
by the Supreme Court.
35. 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
36. See Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
37. 71 F. Supp. at 891.
38. 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
39.
40.

156 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957).
71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).

41.

358 U.S. 354 (1959).

42. See Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (lst Cir. 1959); Keeping v.
Dawson, 262 F.2d 868 (1st. Cir. 1959).
43. 205 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953).
44. The plaintiff had suffered a hernia aboard ship; the issue submitted to the
jury was whether he had broken his warranty of fitness for sea service-he had a
tendency to hernia because of a war wound and had not told the defendant about
it. Id. at 489.
45. 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
46. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Jordine v. Walling,47 decided in 1950, was before the Second Circuit's
rejection of the pendent jurisdiction theory. In Jordine the plaintiff had joined
a Jones Act count to a maintenance and cure count. The trial court dismissed
the Jones Act count at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case but submitted the
maintenance and cure count to the jury, which returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the district court, sitting
at law, lacked jurisdiction to try the maintenance and cure claim; since the
Jones Act claim sounded in tort and the maintenance and cure claim was
quasi-contractual, there was no pendent jurisdiction. The case was remanded
for decision by the same trial judge, but sitting in admiralty.
In Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell ltredge & Dock Co.,48 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, following Jordine, remanded
a judgment rendered on a joined maintenance and cure claim for decision
by the district court, preferably the same judge sitting in admiralty. Thus, at
the time of the Ronero decision, 49 the circuits were split three-to-one against
the right of trial by jury of a maintenance and cure claim joined to a Jones
Act claim. 50
To the apparent dismay of Mr. Justice Black 51 and the outspoken disgust
of some law review writers, 52 the Romero decision did not decide the question
of whether a claim founded on general admiralty law that could not have been
brought separately on the law side could if joined to a Jones Act claim be
submitted to the jury. In a glib passage of a long and intricately reasoned
opinion, the majority said that,
[W]e perceive no barrier to the exercise of "pendent jurisdiction" in
the very limited circumstances before us. Here we merely decide
that a district judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause
of action has been stated if that jurisdiction has been invoked by a
complaint at law rather than by a libel in admiralty, as long as the
complaint also properly alleges a claim under the Jones Act. We
are not called upon to decide whether the District Court may submit
to the jury the "pendent" claims under the general maritime law in
the event that a cause of action be found to exist. 53
In other words, Romero merely held that, when a Jones Act claim was
47. 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
48. 191 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951).
49. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
50. Since the Ninth Circuit had rejected the theory of pendent jurisdiction with
regard to unseaworthiness in Jesonis v. Oliver J. Olson Co., 238 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1956),
perhaps it may be assumed that the circuits stood four to one against the right of
trial by jury.
51. See 358 U.S. at 388 (dissenting opinion).
52. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 32, passim.
53. 358 U.S. at 380-81.
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joined to a maintenance and cure claim, the district court did not have to
dismiss the maintenance and cure count. The Court explicitly left open the
question of whether the maintenance and cure claim could be submitted to
the jury along with the Jones Act claim, or whether it should be reserved
for the consideration of the trial judge sitting as a court of admiralty. The
Supreme Court's abstention led to some surprising decisions in the lower
federal courts.
In B. & C. Fishing Co. v. Amirault04 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, which had previously been the only circuit court of appeals to approve
the submission of both claims to the jury,5 5 construed Romero to preclude
jury trial of a maintenance and cure claim joined to a Jones Act claim. Two
district courts in the Third Circuit, however, which had been the leader in
rejecting the theory of pendent jurisdiction,58 permitted jury trials in diversity
actions brought to recover only maintenance and cure.57 Although the other
circuit courts of appeal did not have occasion to rule on the issue between the
Supreme Court's decisions in Romero and Fitzgerald, two decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicate that the
practice in that circuit was to submit the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
claims to the jury but to reserve decision on maintenance and cure for the
court.58 Thus, when the Fitzgerald case came before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the weight of authority was still opposed
to jury trial of a maintenance and cure claim in a law-side joinder action.
Without belaboring the pendent jurisdiction problem, the Second Circuit
held in Fitzgerald with some regret59 that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
precluded submission of the maintenance and cure issue to the jury. Both
parties had not consented to a jury trial of the maintenance and cure claim,
and the court stated that this claim was not "triable as of right by a jury,"
required by the Federal Rules for submission. Relying on Supreme Court
60
decisions involving suits seeking both damages at law and equitable relief,
54. 292 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1961).
55. See, e.g., Connolly v. Farrell-Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Doucette
v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
56. See Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
57. Morrow v. Point Towing Co., 187 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Neville v.
American Barge Line Co., 182 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
58. See Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1961) ; United Fruit Co. v.
Sumrall, 273 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1960).

59. "We must confess that we can now see no sufficient reason why the Rules
should be so rigidly drawn; we should think it desirable for a judge to have discretion
to send to 'a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right' all or part of equitable or maritime claims closely related to other claims on
which jury trial is being had as of right .. .and would hope that those now engaged
in revising the Rules would consider such a change." 306 F.2d at 470.
60. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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Judge Friendly's majority opinion concluded that the only permissible procedure would be trial of the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims by a jury
and reservation of the maintenance and cure claim for decision by the judge,
sitting without a jury, after the jury had returned its verdict on the other two
issues.
The dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit decision was written by
Judge Clark (the reporter of the committee which drafted the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). The dissenters expressed the view that when
"a claim for maintenance and cure is based on a cause of action unconnected
with that upon which the claims of negligence and unseaworthiness are
founded, then the claim must be pursued in admiralty and there is no right
to a jury trial. However, when all the claims are based on the same cause
of action, they must be tried as a unit and the right of jury trial accorded
by the Jones Act applies to all the contentions. '" 61 The dissent also attacked
the pendent jurisdiction cases such as Jordine v. Walling6 2 which denied
jury trial of the maintenance and cure claim, as "based on form rather than
substance.

63

Like Judge Clark, the majority of the Supreme Court viewed the instant
case as "essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into
separate parts because of historical developments. '64 Instead of refuting
Judge Friendly's reasoning, the Court based its decision on the impossibility
of solving the numerous problems raised by the process of giving the
negligence and unseaworthiness issues to the jury and the maintenance
and cure issue to the judge. The main problem is possible duplication of
damages because of the difficulty of determining what the jury verdict
represents. As the Court noted, lost earnings and medical expenses are
65
recoverable on both the maintenance and cure and negligence counts.
A maintenance and cure award is not reduced by the contributory negligence
of the seaman as is an award under the Jones Act. Maintenance and cure
merely allows recovery for wages ;66possibly under the Jones Act, a seaman
can recover an indemnity for a permanent reduction in his ability to earn
a living. 67 Under maintenance and cure, the seaman can recover medical
expenses only up to the time when his ailment became incurable ;68 under the
61. 306 F.2d at 476 (dissenting opinion).
62. 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
63. 306 F.2d at 478.

64. 374 U.S. at 21.

65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 521 (dissenting opinion).
67. See, e.g., Butwinski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 249 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Ladjimi
v. Pacific Far East Line, 97 F. Supp. 174, 180 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
68. See, e.g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 519 (1949).
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Jones Act, he may be more fully indemnified. 69 As the Court said, splitting
the task of fact-finding between jury and judge "raises needless problems of
who has the burden of proving exactly what the jury did."' 70 The question
of which party has the burden of proving or disproving whether the jury
7
verdict included elements of maintenance and cure has never been settled. '
The awkwardness of the trial judge's position under a separate procedure
was well stated by Judge Wyzanski in Jenkins v. Roderick :72
It is not . . . satisfactory . . . for the judge to keep for himself

the decision on cure and maintenance, and to charge the jury that it
may not allow recovery on account of any medical or hospital
expenses, and that in estimating plaintiff's diminution of earning
capacity it should credit defendant with whatever maintenance award
the judge had decided was just. First, this method assumes that in
his charge the judge tells the jury exactly what he has awarded the
seaman for maintenance. If the judge does not do this, then there
will be a possible duplication of damages. If the judge does tell the
jury what he has awarded for maintenance, no matter how the judge
phrases his charge, the probabilities are that the jury will regard
the judge's award as an expression of his view as to the length
of time the plaintiff was incapacitated. Moreover, the plaintiff may
well fear that a statement by the judge of his award will prejudice
his chances of getting the largest possible verdict from the jury.
Second, this method assumes that the award which the judge will
make for medical bills equals the award which the jury would make.
Ordinarily this assumption is justified. Often the parties stipulate
the amount of medical bills. But in the exceptional case where questions are raised as to whether plaintiff needed the medical attention
he received or whether the medical bills are reasonable, those
questions ought to go to the jury

. . .

and should not be reserved

by the judge.
In short, one can well agree with the Supreme Court's statement that
"an end should be put to such an unfortunate, outdated, and wasteful manner
of trying these cases."173 If this purpose is to be carried out, no alternative
exists to submission of all claims to the jury, because the Jones Act guarantees
trial by jury. The only question is whether the court had the authority to
establish by judicial decision the requirement that all issues be submitted to
the jury when they arise from the same set of facts.
69. E.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir.
1960).
70. 374 U.S. at 19-20.
71. Compare Stendze v. The Boat Neptune, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass. 1955),
which placed the burden on the defendant to show duplication, with Lazarowitz v.
American Export Lines, 87 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1949), which placed the burden om
the seaman.
72. 156 F. Supp. 299, 305-06 (D. Mass. 1957).
73. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
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THE ISSUE OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE

Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the decision established
a rule of procedure in admiralty, whereas the exclusive method for promulgation of such rules had been prescribed by Congress.7 4 He found the matter
to be controlled by the following statute :5
Admiralty rules for district courts.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by
general rules, the . . . procedure in admiralty and maritime cases
in the district courts of the United States ....
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported
to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular
session thereof . . . and until the expiration of ninety days after
they have been thus reported.
This reasoning would seem to be refuted by the consideration that an action
in which claims under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance
and cure are joined, and which is brought at law, is not an admiralty case at
all. It is an odd sort of mongrel, in which traditional admiralty claims are
joined to an action which, by statute, can be brought at law. It is submitted
that, if the Romero decision 76 be construed to mean that a maintenance claim
joined to a Jones Act claim can properly be filed on the law side of a federal
district court, the joined maintenance claim is beyond the reach of the
General Admiralty Rules. 77 It is suggested further that the General Admiralty
Rules were intended to apply only to libels brought on the admiralty side
of a district court.
Similarly, Judge Friendly's construction of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which Mr. Justice Harlan apparently endorsed,78 does not seem
entirely persuasive. Judge Friendly was of the view that, since there would
ordinarily be no right to trial by jury of the maintenance claim, a jury trial
could not be had unless both parties consented. However, he relied on precedents involving joinder of legal and equitable causes of action.79 There are
two significant differences between a law-equity joinder and a law-admiralty
74. Id. at 22 (dissenting opinion).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1958).

76. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
77. The Fitzgerald case is thus distinguishable from Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S.
641 (1960), which Mr. Justice Harlan cited. 374 U.S. at 22. Miner v. Atlass involved

the construction of rule 44 of the General Admiralty Rules as applied to the attempt of
a claimant in a petition for limitation of liability to take depositions for the purpose
of discovery under a local rule of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
78. Supra note 77, at 22.
79. E.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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joinder. For one, the courts of equity grant specific relief which courts of
law are not competent to give. An action for maintenance and cure is an
action for a money judgment, whether brought at law or in admiralty. Secondly,
in no judicial system, state or federal, are issues in purely equitable actions submitted to juries for binding verdicts. However, as was shown earlier, state
courts have always granted trials by jury in maintenance and cure actions, 0
as have federal courts in diversity cases.8 1 If the size of the award sued for
and diversity of citizenship can boost a maintenance and cure action into the
law side of a federal court, it is hard to see why joinder with a Jones Act
claim cannot do the same.
If the views of Mr. Justice Harlan and Judge Friendly had prevailed,
one would be left with a vacuum which only Congress could fill. The procedural
change desired could not be accomplished by amending the General Admiralty
Rules because there would then be a conflict with the interpretation that
has been placed upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On the other
hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be cluttered with such
minutiae as a rule governing right to trial by jury in a case where maintenance and cure and Jones Act claims are joined. The proper way to effect the
reform might be congressional action. However, despite complaints about
the loose drafting of the Jones Act,8 2 Congress has not clarified it in the
more than forty years since its enactment. Therefore, it seems doubtful that
Congress would have acted to solve the problem presented by the Fitzgerald
case. Although advocates of judicial restraint might accuse the Court of
having accomplished the desired result by waving a magic wand which
it did not possess, any judicial legislating done by the Court in this case
would seem to have been justified. It was long overdue.
JONATHAN

P.

MARGET*

80. See cases cited note 18 supra.
81. See cases cited note 19 supra.
82. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 281-82 (1957). The Jones Act's constitutionality
"was upheld by a Supreme Court which might better have struck it down as offensive
to the due process clause by reason of impossibly bad drafting."
* Third-year student, American University.

THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS IN
THE FEDERAL REGISTER ACT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT; THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
PUBLICATION AND NONPUBLICATION
In 1962 the Second Circuit held in United States v. Aarons' that a
Coast Guard order closing a portion of New London Harbor was within the
publication requirements of the Federal Register Act2 and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 8 but that failure of publication was no defense to those who
had actual knowledge of the order. Prior to this, in 1954, the Ninth Circuit in
Hotch v. United States4 espoused the seemingly anomalous rule that one with
actual knowledge of an unpublished regulation cannot be adjudged guilty of
its violation. The Aarons case, therefore, reflects a split among the circuit
courts of appeals on the legal effects of the failure to comply with the publication requirements of these federal statutes.
The genesis of the Aarons controversy is traced to November of 1960,
when the nuclear powered submarine U.S.S. Ethan Allen was launched from
the ways of the Electric Boat Company into the Thames River at New London,
Connecticut. The Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA) had continually protested the Polaris program, and served notice that it planned to
stage a major protest on the launching date. The Commander of the Third
Coast Guard District issued a Special Notice closing the Thames River to
traffic for the period necessary to launch the Ethan Allen. This Special Notice
warned that anyone coming within the specified boundaries during the period
of launching would be subject to penalties. The Local Notice to Mariners
contained a copy of the notice and a copy was also sent by registered mail to
the CNVA; however, there was no publication in the Federal Register.
Authority to issue such notice is derived from the Magnuson Act,5 which
directs the President, whenever he finds the national security threatened, to
issue rules "to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or
other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar nature, vessels,
harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities in the United States ..

.",

An

executive order issued by President Truman pursuant to the Magnuson Act
directs the local Coast Guard Commander to control harbor traffic when he
7
deems nonaction inimical to the United States.
1. 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
2. 49 Stat. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. §§ 301-14 (1958).
3. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
4. 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
5. 40 Stat. 220 (1917), 50 U.S.C. §§ 191-95 (1958).
6.40 Stat. 220 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 191(b) (1958).
7.Exec. Order No. 10173, 15 Fed. Reg. 7012 (1950).
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During the launching of the Ethan Allen the CNVA came within the
limits of the prohibited area by boat; a copy of the notice was served again,
but the CNVA continued deeper into the area until a Coast Guard vessel
forcibly removed them. Aarons and Swann, among others, were indicted in
the District Court for Connecticut for violating the Magnuson Act. After
conviction both Aarons and Swann appealed. The court of appeals in the
decision presently under analysis held that although notice of the order should
have been published in the Federal Register, Aarons and Swann, having had
actual knowledge, were not immunized from prosecution.
The purpose of this Case Note is two-fold: to question the propriety of
including the Coast Guard Commander's Special Notice within the publication
provisions of the above-mentioned federal legislation, and to examine the
rationale which guided each circuit to a different conclusion on the legal effects
of publication and nonpublication. The scope of the publication provisions in
the FRA and the APA is the first topic of inquiry. In Aarons the Second
Circuit concluded that the Coast Guard order was subject to the publication
requirements of the FRA and APA but not without first commenting,
"[Tlhose deeply sympathetic with the purpose of these statutes may be
surprised to encounter them in this context .

. . ."

The court's holding on

this issue is grounded on interpretations of section 2(c) of the APA and 5 (a)
of the FRA. The former defines the term "rule" used in the publication provision of the APA which requires "rules" to be published. 9 Section 5 of the
FRA requires publication in the Federal Register of "such documents or
classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time have
general applicability and legal effect," and "for the purposes of this chapter
every document or order which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to
have general applicability and legal effect." 10 However, the Special Notice of
the Coast Guard prescribed no penalty; it was the Magnuson Act itself that
set forth the punishment for infringement of the law." Therefore, the government argued, the notice was exempted from the publication requirement, a
holding in United States v. Richman.12 The court in Aarons chose not to
accept this interpretation. The Second Circuit made use of the general
language of a regulation issued pursuant to section 6 of the FRA13 and con4
cluded publication was required.1
8. 310 F.2d at 345.
9. " 'Rule' means the whole or any part of any agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law." 62 Stat. 99 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
10. 49 Stat. 501 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1958).
11. 40 Stat. 220, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
12. 190 F. Supp. 889, 892 (D. Conn. 1961).
13. 49 Stat. 501 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. § 306 (1958).
14. The regulation defines "documents having general applicability and legal effect"
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An examination of the legislative history of both the FRA and the APA
affords almost no clue as to the intended scope of the publication requirements
of these statutes. However, an analysis of the problems these statutes were
enacted to eradicate leads to a convincing line of reasoning exempting the
Coast Guard order from the publication provisions. From all indications the
underlying concept of the publication provisions of these statutes is to afford
the public proper notice of agency pronouncements which are legislative in
character.' 5 If an agency is not legislating, but pursuing an executory function,
it would follow that the publication provisions of the statutes are inapplicable.
Agency legislative action has been described as
the issue of general or particular regulations which in form or effect
are like the statutes of the Congress. Among these are such regulations as those which state minimum wage requirements or agricultural
marketing rules. Congress-if it had the time, the staff, and the
organization-would itself prescribe those things. Because Congress
does not do so itself and yet desires these things be done, the legislative power to do them has been conferred upon administrative
offices and agencies. 16
Hotch v. United States17 affords a perfect example of the process of
agency legislation which the publication provisions of the FRA and APA were
tailored to cover. In Hotch a regulation extending the period of a fishing ban
in a particular zone was promulgated. There a law was enacted by the agency.
Similarly, in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrilli8 the agency action under
study was a clear exercise of the legislative function, a regulation having
been enacted which dealt with the insurability of wheat crops. Indeed, the
regulations issued by President Truman under the Magnuson Act which
authorized the action of the Coast Guard Commander were legislative in
character and were properly published in the Federal Register in compliance
with the relevant provisions of the FRA and APA. Although the activities
of the President are usually executive in nature, the Magnuson Act delegated
the power to legislate, and the President in issuing regulations under the
Magnuson Act was enacting law, not enforcing it.
It is submitted that in Aarons the Coast Guard Commander who issued
the Special Notice was not legislating, but acting in an executive capacity,
as including "every document, issued under proper authority, prescribing a penalty or a
course of conduct . . . and relevant or applicable to the general public, the members of a
" 1 C.F.R. 1.32
locality as distinguished from named individuals or organizations ...
(1949).
1 15. Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of
Federal Regulations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1950).
16. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 358 (1946).
17., 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
18. 332 U.S. 381 (1947).
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merely enforcing legislation already in effect, the Magnuson Act and the
Presidential regulations issued thereunder.' 9 The distinction advocated here
is one drawn between the promulgation of "rules" as defined in section 2(c)
of the APA, and agency action of a supplemental nature which is in exercise of
a power conferred by such "rules. ' 20 If the Coast Guard Commander had
performed his executory function by merely being present at the time of the
launching and ordering the CNVA forcibly removed after they disobeyed an
oral command, the publication issue would never have arisen. If the Commander
had ordered his subordinates to prevent any craft from entering the launching
area, again no issue of publication would exist. Why is there a different result
because the Coast Guard Commander in the process of performing the
executory function chose to issue a Special Notice? The Second Circuit in
Aarons interpreted the scope of the publication provisions of the FRA and
APA without making a distinction between the legislative and executive
functions.This distinction could have been drawn and the court might have
concluded that the scope of the publication provisions in these federal statutes
was limited to agency legislative action.
Another theory might have exempted the Special Notice from the
publication provisions of the FRA and APA, but was not given any direct
mention in the Aarons opinion. Suppose an oil tanker in the Thames River
began to leak oil, posing a serious threat of disaster. Would a Coast Guard
order forbidding water traffic have to be published in the Federal Register?'1
If an enemy submarine were detected in the river and the Coast Guard Commander deemed it imperative to close the harbor to shipping, would he first be
required to comply with the publication provisions? These hypotheticals present
the emergency situation. The Magnuson Act, designed to safeguard the nation's
ports in time of emergency, provides the machinery to cope with such situations. The publication sections of the FRA and APA contain no provisions
which touch upon the emergency situation. Yet the need for quick, efficient,
and knowledgeable action is found amid the pressures which necessitated the
rise of the administrative tribunal in our form of government. 22 This realization makes it unreasonable to argue that there need be publication of administrative action in the face of an emergency. If Congress had intended to include
all types of agency activity within the publication provisions of the acts, then
in all likelihood provision would have been made for exempting an agency
from the publication requirements in the face of an emergency. Although in
19. This argument is developed in appellee's brief, p. 28, United States v. Aarons,
310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962), but the court's opinion is silent on the issue.
20. The definition of rule is set forth in note 9 supra.
21. This example is used in appellee's brief, p. 26, United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d
341 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 6.10 (1959).
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Aarons there may have been enough time for publication, many situations
might confront those acting under the Magnuson Act where there would
not be. Can one conclude consistently with Aarons that publication would not
be required in the true emergency situation?
The legal effects of publication and nonpublication of agency regulations
as determined by the FRA and APA afford the final topic of inquiry. For
discussion purposes it is now assumed that these federal statutes did require
publication of the Commander's notice. The Ninth Circuit in Hotch and the
Second Circuit in Aarons have reached opposite conclusions as to the legal
effects of the failure to publish agency regulations. 23 Steven Hotch was
adjudged not guilty of violating an unpublished regulation even when he had
actual notice of its existence, but Aarons and Swann were denied the shield of
nonpublication when it appeared that they had actual notice.
The purpose of the publication provisions in the acts should determine
the legal effects of publication and nonpublication. Was it the purpose of
Congress to enact basic recording statutes, or was publication intended to be a
final procedural step before the status of law could be accorded the quasilegislative activities of administrative tribunals? A resolution of this dilemma
was sought in Hotch and Aarons by examining the legislative history of the
relevant provisions of the FRA and APA.
The Ninth Circuit in Hotch rested its conclusion that publication is a
condition precedent to the validity of administrative regulations specifically on
section 5 of the FRA 24 and sections 325 and 426 of the APA. As noted, these
sections require publication of certain agency activities. The Department of
the Interior failed to publish the continuance of a fishing ban pursuant to
section 5; however, defendant Hotch had actual knowledge of the agency
regulation when he chose to fish in Taku Inlet. In seeking a conviction the
Government argued that Congress intended section 5 of the FRA to serve as
a recording statute affording constructive notice of agency regulations to all
concerned. It was reasoned that where actual knowledge is present, record
notice is no longer relevant; and therefore Hotch was guilty of violating the
fishing ban he actually knew existed even though the agency never published
23. It is later concluded that these decisions are not as irreconcilable as they first
appear.

24. 49 Stat. 501 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 305 (1958).
25. "Every agency shall separately state and currently
Register . . . substantive rules adopted as authorized by law .

publish in the Federal
60 Stat. 238 (1946),

5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958).
26. "General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register . . . . The required publication or service of any substantive rule . . . shall be

made not less than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except as otherwise

provided by the agency upon good cause found and published with the rule." 60 Stat. 238

(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
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the ban in the Federal Register. The government bolstered its argument by
the language of section 7 of the FRA which reads in part:
No document required . . . to be published in the Federal Register

shall be valid as against any person who has not had actual knowledge
thereof until the . . . document shall have been filed .... 27
The court's answer to this argument is perhaps the weakest point in Hotch.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion admits that under section 7 actual notice of the
28
defendant will mitigate the filing requirement of section 2 of the FRA, but
concludes that sections 2 and 7 are to be construed apart from the "independent
requirement" of publication in section 5 of the FRA. 29 Under this Ninth Circuit
interpretation actual notice of the regulation does not mitigate the "independent" publication requirement of section 5. Criticism of the Hotch case seems
always directed toward this construction of the FRA.8 0 A close interpretation
of the act shows the better construction to be that the requirements of filing
and publication are not independent. Once there is compliance with the
section 2 filing provision, then publication in the Federal Register follows
automatically. Therefore, since section 7 makes filing unnecessary where actual
notice exists, it is reasonable to conclude that the publication requirement was
also intended to be relaxed.31
Had the Hotch decision, that publication is a condition precedent to a
valid regulation, rested completely on an interpretation of sections 3 and 4 of
the APA, it is suggested that the holding would be free from censure. Section 3
is entitled "Public Information" and contains the publication requirement.
Section 4 is entitled "Rule Making" and sets forth the process each agency
is to follow when exercising the power to legislate. Section 4(c) provides that
'2
agency regulations are to be published thirty days "prior to the effective date."1
It seems very probable that Congress intended compliance with section 4 to be
history
a condition precedent to the promulgation of a valid rule. Legislative
3
conclusion.
Circuit's
Ninth
the
of section 4 also serves to fortify
The Second Circuit in Aarons held that failure of publication was no
shield to the defendants who possessed actual knowledge of the Special Notice.
27. 49 Stat. 502 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1958).
28. The original and two duplicate originals or certified copies of any document

required or authorized to be published under section 305 . . . shall be filed with
the Division. . . . The Division shall transmit immediately to the Government
Printing Office . . . each document required or authorized to be published under
Every Federal agency shall cause to be transmitted for filing as
section 305 ....
herein required . . . all such documents issued, prescribed, or promulgated by
the agency.

49 Stat. 501 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 302 (1958).
29. 212 F.2d at 282.
30. See DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 22, § 6.10.
31. Ibid.

32. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(c) (1958).
33. 212 F.2d at 282.
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The court's opinion primarily attacks the strained interpretation of section 7
of the FRA made by the Ninth Circuit in Hotch, and concludes, "The filing
and publication requirements of the Federal Register Act are not independent." 34 This interpretation serves to classify the FRA as a mere recording
statute, and perhaps correctly.3 5
The Aaron court also interprets the section 3 publication requirement
of the APA. This provision, concludes the court, specifies no sanction for the
failure to publish substantive rules. It is then reasoned that since the APA
was enacted by Congress to supplement the FRA, Congress intended the
sanction of section 7 of the FRA to apply.36 As noted, the seemingly proper
construction of section 7 makes an unpublished rule ineffective only against a
defendant who has no actual notice of the regulation; it does not make publication a condition precedent to the validity of a regulation. Since Aarons and
Swann had actual knowledge, failure of publication was no shield to them. It
is all-important to note the absence of an interpretation of section 4 of the
APA, which sets forth the rule-making procedures, from the court's consideration of that act. An excuse for not meeting the provisions of section 4
3
Had section 4 been
is presented by the particular facts of the Aarons caseY.
applicable to Aarons, would the Second Circuit then have followed the Hotch
interpretation of the APA by holding that compliance with the rule-making
procedures (including publication) is a condition precedent to the promulgation of a valid regulation? Of some aid in satisfying this inquiry is a footnote
in Aarons-which states the inapplicability of section 4 of the APA and then
supposes that if section 4 were under consideration "in some instances,
different considerations may apply." 38 Since the Second Circuit did not
undertake a construction of section 4, it is a premature observation to conclude that this circuit regards the publication provisions of the APA as serving
the function of recording statutes in the same category as those of the FRA.
The problem raised by Hotch and Aarons, the purpose of provisions
requiring publication, has also raised itself on the state level. The Model
Administrative Procedure Act contains a provision which indicates that
regulations are not to become law until the condition precedent of filing has
been accomplished ;39 actual knowledge seems of no consequence in the Model
Act. Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law contains a publication section
which states, "Regulations . . . shall have no effect until a copy thereof,
34. 310 F.2d at 346.

LAVERY, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 412 (1952).
310 F.2d at 348.
"[T]he Special Notice was within the exception to § 4 for 'any military, naval, or
affairs function of the United States.' " 310 F.2d at 348 n.3.
Ibid.
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3 (1950).

35. See
36.
37.
foreign
38.
39.
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certified by the executive officer, chairman or secretary of the agency, is filed
in the Department of State
.40 Thus it seems clear that filing the proposed
regulation with the Department of State is intended to be a condition precedent
to the promulgation of a valid regulation. However, our appellate courts have
not yet rendered a direct interpretation of the Pennsylvania statute in question.
The inviting analogy to recording statutes has already been made in Commonwealth v. Case,4 1 where a trial court apparently viewed the presence or absence
of actual knowledge as a proper consideration in determining the validity of
an unfiled regulation with respect to a particular defendant. On the other
hand, New York has undoubtedly subscribed to the Hotch view. Article IV,
section 8 of the New York Constitution requires that proposed agency regulations be filed with the Department of State. People v. Cull recently interpreted
this provision to mean that filing is a condition precedent to the validity of
the regulation. 42 In Cull New York's highest court affirmed the reversal of a
speeding conviction because the proposed regulation designating the maximum
speed had never been filed in accordance with the constitutional directive. The
opinion carefully noted that the presence of highway signs posting the speed
48
limit was immaterial to the inquiry.
In summation, while Hotch considers compliance with the publication
requirements in the FRA and APA a condition precedent to the promulgation
of a valid agency regulation, the Aarons holding relegates the publication
provisions of the acts to the level of mere recording statutes (unimportant
where actual notice is involved) in instances exempt from section 4 of the
APA. It is submitted that Aarons, not Hotch, correctly interprets the publication provisions of the FRA as serving the purpose of a recording device. The
Hotch interpretation of the APA's publication provisions is probably still the
law however. Had the Second Circuit been faced with a situation within the
section 4 rule-making provision, it is difficult to believe that the Hotch inter44
pretation would have been rejected.
The FRA may have been designed only to mitigate the harshness of the
maxim that ignorance of the law' is no excuse-thus where actual knowledge
is present, there is no need to comply with the publication requirement. On the
other hand, the subsequently enacted APA took cognizance in section 4 of a
growing evil in the "fourth" branch of our government, the administrative
tribunal. A less known maxim must be focused upon: "A law not properly
40. PA.
41.
42.
43.
44.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 71, § 1710.21 (1962).

21 Pa. D. & C.2d 34 (C.P. 1959).
10 N.Y.2d 129, 176 N.E.2d 495 (1961).
Id. at 139, 176 N.E.2d at 498.
See Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922 (1959).

82

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

published to the people is no law."'45 The Hotch view that publication in a
specific place is a condition precedent to validity seems to assure order.
ARTHUR L.

45.

LAVERY,

op. cit. supra note 35, § 1098.

JENKINS,

JR.

COMMONWEALTH v. SITKIN'S JUNK COMPANY:
PENNSYLVANIA SALES TAX CONCEPT
OF MANUFACTURING JUNKED
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania announced in Commonwealth v.
Sitkin's Junk Co.1 that judicial decisions holding certain business activities
to be manufacturing under prior Pennsylvania taxing statutes will not be
controlling as to what activities are manufacturing under the Pennsylvania
Selective Sales and Use Tax Act of 1956.2 The Bureau of Sales and Use Tax
assessed an additional tax on machinery used by the taxpayer in sorting,
cutting, baling, and performing other functions necessary to prepare scrap for
shipment and sale to various steel companies. The taxpayer successfully
contended the machinery was used directly in manufacturing and therefore
exempt. This Case Note reviews Sitkin's Junk in light of prior law with
consideration of the tax refund possibilities suggested by the case and analyzes
the effect that the construction given the act will have on future law.
The term manufacturing has long had a settled judicial meaning. A
change is implied, but every change is not manufacturing.3 A new article must
be produced with a different name, character, or function than that of the
4
original material.
A lower court decision, Commonwealth v. Donovan,5 first considered the
applicability of the judicial definition of manufacturing to the Selective Act.
The constant application of the one-hundred-year-old definition led the court
to conclude that the definition set forth in the act was intended to describe the
process of manufacturing and not to enlarge the judicial definition. 6 The court
further reasoned that since the act was passed to provide revenue for public
education, to alter the established definition of manufacturing would seriously
reduce the tax revenue, for "the Commonwealth could not collect the tax
from any business which performs any work upon personal property ... "
The court did not "believe the legislature intended such an interpreta1. 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199 (1963).

2.

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3403-1 to -605 (Supp. 1962).

3. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908).
4. Tide-Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 210, 216 (1898); Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 616 (1887).
The following Pennsylvania cases illustrate operations held not to produce a new and
different product: Commonwealth v. American Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768 (1961)
(production of ice by artificial methods); Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty
(converting paper to adhesive paper, sealing
Inc., 344 Pa. 283, 25 A.2d 323 (1940)
tape, and kindred products) ; Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., 316 Pa. 29, 173
Atl. 633 (1934) (splitting, polishing, and dressing stones for ornamental purposes);
Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447, 141 Atl. 148 (1928) (cutting and
curing of pork).
5. 76 Dauph. Co. Rep. 191 (Commonwealth Ct. 1960).
6. Id. at 198.
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tion ....,,7The court also said that since an exemption from tax was being
construed, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
An exemption from taxation is freedom from a burden to which others
are subjected," and when a taxpayer is within the general language of a tax
statute, all exempting provisions must be strictly construed against the one
claiming the exemption. 9 An exclusion from tax, on the other hand, leaves
the taxpayer without the scope of the taxing statute, and if the question is
whether he belongs to the class upon which the tax is imposed, the tax statute
must be strictly construed against the taxing authority. 10 Stated differently, a
provision granting relief from tax is construed against the taxpayer; a provision imposing a tax is construed against the taxing authority.1 '
The Selective Act uses the words exemption and exclusion interchangeably and indiscriminately ;12 therefore, a decision whether to strictly construe
a provision against the taxing authority or the taxpayer based on labels alone
would be unsatisfactory. The better test would be whether the particular
provision grants a tax relief or imposes a tax. The court was of the view that
it was dealing with an exempting provision when it considered the definition
of manufacturing, as set forth in the definition section of the act.' 3 The court
probably reasoned in this manner. Section 602 of the act establishes the
presumption that every sale of tangible personal property is at retail and
subject to tax. Specifically excluded from the taxable sale at retail are sales of
machinery and equipment used directly in the operation of manufacturing
personal property. 14 The court evidently concluded that although manufacturing was "excluded" from the meaning of sale at retail, the actual effect of the
"exclusion" was to grant a tax relief. Therefore the term manufacturing should
be construed as an exemption.
In Sitkin's Junk, however, the court said that "the true exemptions in
the Act are set forth in Section 203 . . . ."15 The manufacturing definition is
not in that section of the act. 16 This rule will apparently resolve the conflict
of whether a particular provision is to be construed as an exclusion or an
7. Id. at 199,
8. Flour v. Sheridan, 137 Ind. 28, 36 N.E. 365 (1894).
9. Fisher v. City of Pittsburgh, 178 Pa. Super. 16, 112 A.2d 818, aff'd, 383 Pa. 138,
118 A.2d 157 (1955). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558(5) (1952).
10. Thaw Estate, 163 Pa. Super. 484, 63 A.2d 417 (1949). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
46, § 558(3) (1952).
11. See generally Commonwealth v. 219 1 Co-op. Inc., 408 Pa. 24, 183 A.2d 325 (1962).
12. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-203 (Supp. 1962).
13. 76 Dauph. Co. Rep. at 200.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(J) (7) (a) (Supp. 1962).
15. 412 Pa. at 141, 194 A.2d at 204. The court refers to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 3403-203 (Supp. 1962).
16. The definition of manufacturing is contained in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 3403-2(c) (Supp. 1962).
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exemption. Section 3403-203 will be construed against the taxpayer; the
provisions in article I of the act will be construed against the taxing authority.
This particular application of Sitkin's Junk will have less importance
7
under the Tax Act of 1963 for Education (amending the Selective Act),1
since that is a general taxing statute, giving rise to a presumption that all
tangible personal property is taxable.' 8 The holding will have continued
importance, however, because the Selective Act will undoubtedly be further
litigated. The Commonwealth may make an assessment against a taxpayer as
long as three years after his return is filed, or at the end of the year in which
the tax liability arises, whichever is later. 19 Under this provision it is possible
to subject a taxpayer to an assessment covering four prior years. Failure to
file a return 20 or a false or fraudulent return,2 1 will permit an assessment to
be issued anytime. In addition the taxpayer may by consent extend the period
for assessment.2 2 In light of these assessment provisions the Selective Act
will remain a basis for assessing tax deficiencies for a substantial number of
years, and the rules of construction applied to determine whether a taxpayer
falls within certain classifications under the act should be to his benefit. For
example, future construction of such terms as farming, dairying, or agriculture,
which are excluded from the definition of sale at retail,23 will not be treated as
exemptions from the tax and will be construed in the taxpayer's favor.
Of more significance to taxpayers in the future is the holding in Sitkin's
Junk that the legislature by extensively defining the word manufacture in
the statute intended to substitute that definition for the judicial one. The
legislative definition of manufacture is as follows:
"Manufacture." The performance of manufacturing, fabricating,
compounding, processing or other operations, engaged in as a
business, which place any personal property in a form, composition
or character different from that in which it is acquired whether for
sale or use by the manufacturer .... 24
17. Pa. Laws 1963, act 43.
18. Commonwealth v. Rohm & Hass Co., 74 Dauph. Co. Rep. 383, 385 (Commonwealth Ct. 1960).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-560 (Supp. 1962). For example, assume A filed
his sales tax return on January 1, 1958, and on December 31, 1961, the Bureau of Sales
and Use Tax issued an assessment against A for a period commencing January 1, 1958.
The Bureau has effectively gone back four years. The three-year provision would expire
on January 1, 1961, but since 1961 is the year the tax liability has arisen, the assessment
is timely, for the time for assessment extends to the end of the tax year. Note that if
the assessment were issued one day later on January 1, 1962, then the entire year of
1958 would be striken from the assessment.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-561 (Supp. 1962).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-562 (Supp. 1962).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-563 (Supp. 1962).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(J)(7)(b) (Supp. 1962).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c) (Supp. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
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The first criterion set forth for determining whether an operation is
manufacturing is the activity in which the business is engaged. Activities that
25
will qualify as set forth in the definition are manufacturing, fabricating,
26
compounding, and processing. The problem that arises is of what significance
are the words "other operations" in the manufacturing definition. In Sitkin's
Junk the court reasoned away an application of ejusdem generis and said
that " 'other operations' include and embrace other types of activities not
covered by the words 'manufacturing, fabricating, compounding, processing.' "27
An operation is "action or activity and is the action of making or promanufacturAn early Pennsylvania case considering
ducing something ... .,"28
29
ing discussed some aspects of what it is to make something.
To make in the mechanical sense does not signify to create out of
nothing, for that surpasses all human power. It does not often mean
the production of a new article out of materials entirely raw. It
generally consists in giving new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations to matter which has already gone through some other
artificial process.
Based on this reasoning the mere sawing of a board, the bending of a pipe,
the addition of water to sugar could be classified as giving a new shape,
quality, or combination to property; and therefore a making and therefore an
operation. It would seem that unlimited benefits could be received by businessmen if such a broad concept were literally applied to determine who are
manufacturers under the act. Perhaps this consideration led courts to impose
under judicial constructions the requirement that a new and different product
emerge.
The second criterion of manufacturing set forth in the act is similar to
the judicial requirements: the property must be placed in a different "form,
composition, or character.13 0 If a person is engaged in the business of purchasing straight pipes and his operation is merely the act of bending that pipe, it
would emerge in a form or shape different from when acquired. Though the
court in Sitkin's Junk has held that a new product will not have to emerge for
the activity to be manufacturing within the act, it is most probable that an
activity such as the bending of a pipe will not qualify as putting the property
in a different form. Support for this proposition can be found in the approach
25. Logically, the word being defined would not be used in defining it; therefore, it
can be
qualify
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

argued that the meaning of manufacturing here must be those operations that
as manufacturing under prior judicial constructions of that word.
"Processing" is defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2(c.1) (Supp. 1962).
412 Pa. at 139, 194 A.2d at 203.
Ibid.
Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. 494, 496 (1856).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c) (Supp. 1962).
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taken by the court in the final paragraph of its decision. The court states,
concerning the operation in Sitkin, "The difference in the scrap when acquired
and the scrap after handling by the taxpayers is sufficient to bring the taxpayer's activities within the operation of the manufacturing exclusion of the
Act." 31 The test now to be applied is that the operation must place the
property in a form sufficiently different. The question of when a product
becomes sufficiently different for the manufacturing exemption to apply will
undoubtedly require further clarification by the courts.
While it will be necessary to construe each operation on an ad hoc basis
to determine whether the product produced is sufficiently different, in light of
the court's apprehension in Donovan that the Commonwealth will not be able
to tax any personal property on which some work is performed, it seems when
a court clarifies this issue, it may well desire to contract its apparently broad
scope. One method of imposing a limitation on the operations that may be
considered sufficiently different can be inferred from the factual situation of
Sitkin's Junk.
The operations performed by Sitkin would probably be considered
manufacturing had they been performed by steel mills as a part of the process
of making steel. 32 Sitkin purchased mixed, unsorted scrap, removed the
unusable, unsalable portion, sorted the remaining metallic scrap, and then cut
it into convenient lengths or baled it. These operations required the use of
expensive machinery, alligator shears, hydraulic presses, acetyline torches,
cranes, trucks and other light and heavy equipment, and the labor of forty or
fifty skilled or semiskilled employees. 3 3 This could be considered the first
production stage of making steel, and manufacturing if performed by a steel
mill. The Selective Act elaborates on its definition of manufacturing by
providing that included will be: "Every operation commencing with the first
production stage . . ,,14
Herein may be the difference between the judicial
definition and the statutory one. The prior definition required a new and
different product; very possibly the statute has changed the prior definition
to require only one stage in the production of a new and different product.
Such a change in the product may constitute a sufficient difference under
Sitkin. Possibly a future decision will want to view all production stages
collectively to determine if the activity in question is one stage in the production of a sufficiently different product.
31. 412 Pa. at 142, 194 A.2d at 204. (Emphasis added.)
32. Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co., 77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 366, 371 (Commonwealth
Ct. 1961) (dictum), rev'd, 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199 (1963). The lower court cited Hazen
Engineering Co. v. Pitt, 189 Pa. Super. 531, 150 A.2d 855 (1959) in support of the
proposition that the same operation may be manufacturing for some and not for others.

33. Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk, supra note 32, at 367-68, 371.
34. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c) (1) (Supp. 1962).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 68

Even if an individual was engaged in a business which would not quite
qualify as manufacturing under the act it was possible for him to get some
sales-tax relief. The theory used was that of resale.8 5 If a producer purchased
personal property and that property was to be physically incorporated into
other personal property which was to be sold in the regular course of his
business, 6 then he could execute an exemption certificate3 7 and the purchase
would be tax free. Sitkin's Junk will have no effect on this theory.
The purchase of machinery, equipment, and supplies to be used or consumed directly in the manufacturing operation are also exempted . 8 Therefore
those producers who can now be classified as manufacturers under the act
can purchase such items tax free. They need only provide their vendor with
an exemption certificate. The test of whether property is directly used is often
difficult to apply, 39 but the Bureau of Sales and Use Tax has issued the
following factors to be considered in making the determination :40
a. The physical proximity of the property, while in use, to the production process;
b. The proximity of the time of use of the property to the production
process; and
c. The active causal relationship between the use of the property and
the production of a manufactured product. In order to meet the direct
use test, it is essential that the taxpayer establish such active causal
relationship.
If property has another use besides its direct employment in manufacturing,
4
the latter use must be the predominant one. '
The Bureau has said, however, that sales for administrative, managerial,
sales, and other nonoperational activities, are not directly used in manufacturing, and are subject to tax. 42 Nor does the manufacturing exemption extend
to vehicles or tractors required to be registered under the Vehicle Code 43 or
to maintenance facilities, materials or supplies used or consumed in construction, reconstruction, remodeling, repair or maintenance of real estate, other
44
than machinery, equipment, parts or foundations affixed to real estate.
The Department of Revenue is statutorily commanded to refund all taxes,
interest, and penalties paid to the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is not
35.
36.
37.
3.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(h) (Supp. 1962).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(h) (2) (Supp. 1962).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-546(c) (Supp. 1962).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(J) (7) (a) (Supp. 1962).
2 CCH STATE TAx REP. Pa. 60-211.30 (1962).
2 CCH STATE TAX REP. Pa. 60-210 (1957).

See

Ibid.
Ibid.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,

§§ 101-1501 (1960).
§ 3403-2(h)(7)(c) (Supp. 1962).
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rightfully entitled thereto.45 While various refund provisions are set forth in
the act, the most significant one for taxpayers now able to qualify as manufacturers is this:
Where any tax, interest or penalty has
vision of this act subsequently held by final
competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional,
tion of such provision subsequently held

been paid under a projudgment of a court of
or under an interpretaby such court to be

erroneous, a petition for refund may be filed . . . but such petition

must be filed within46five years of the date of the payment of which a
refund is requested.

Since Sitkin's Junk held that the interpretation placed on the word manufacture was erroneous, taxpayers may now petition the Department of
Revenue through the Bureau of Sales and Use Tax for refunds covering the
five-year period before the date of their petition.
The petition for refund must set forth the grounds upon which the refund
is claimed and be accompanied by an affidavit affirming the facts set forth
therein as true and correct. 47 The Department of Revenue must dispose of
the issues raised in the petition for refund within six months after receipt of
the petition; however, by stipulation the time may be extended for an addi48
tional six months.
The decision in Commonwealth v. McHugh 49created a similar refund
situation for construction contractors who performed certain types of constructing, reconstructing, remodeling, repairing, or maintenance functions on
facilities used in rendering a public utility service. To expedite the refunds
made necessary by McHugh, the Bureau of Sales and Use Tax published a
standard refund petition for use by taxpayers. An analogous arrangement may
be made by the Bureau for the manufacturers' refund.
Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk leaves uncertainties as to the interpretation that will be given the term manufacturing in the Selective Act. The possibility of receiving refunds will operate as a motivating force to test the uncertainties of the decision.
STANLEY

tit. 72, § 3403-552 (Supp. 1962).

45.

PA. STAT. ANN.

46.
47.
48.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
PA. STAT. ANN.
PA. STAT. ANN.

72, § 3403-553(d) (Supp. 1962).
tit. 72, § 3403-553(A) (Supp. 1962).
tit. 72, § 3403-553(c) (Supp. 1962).

49. 406 Pa. 566, 178 A.2d 556 (1962).

E.

STETTZ

PARENTHOOD BY ESTOPPEL BARS HUSBAND'S USE
OF BLOOD TESTS IN SUPPORT ACTION
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania faced in Commonwealth ex rel.
Weston v. Weston' the problem of whether a husband could invoke in a
2
support proceeding the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity.
The husband requested that blood tests be given to the children conceived and born of his wife in an action instituted by the wife for support of herself and her two children. Upon the petition of the husbanddefendant, the lower court ordered that blood tests be administered.8 The
court was "of the opinion that under the decision of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman,4 . . . [it]
had no alternative but to enter the order prayed for in the husband's
petition." 5 The petition was filed under the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity, which states that "the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born during wedlock is overcome if . . . [blood] tests show that the

husband is not the father of the child." Upon appeal, the superior court in
Weston distinguished the Goldman case, and refused the husband's petition.
It is the purpose of this Case Note to consider the applicability of the uniform
act in a support action and to weigh the effect this decision may have upon
the use of blood tests in various kinds of intra-family litigation.
The superior court states that "the defendant had lived with his wife
for several years after the birth of both children," and "there is no suggestion
that he did not accept them as his children prior to filing his petition ...
[U]nder these circumstances the court below was not bound by the Goldman
case

. . .

to order a blood test. '

7

The thrust of the majority opinion seems to

be that when a husband holds a child out to be his own he is estopped from
denying paternity of that child by introducing the results of a blood test, One
may question whether the decision can be substantiated in light of the language
of the statute and the Goldman holding.
The Goldman case was the only opportunity afforded a Pennsylvania
appellate court to examine the Uniform Act of 1961 prior to Weston. Effective July 13, 1961, the act repealed its predecessor the Blood Test Act of
1951,8 which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had construed as inapplicable
1. 201 Pa. Super. 554, 193 A.2d 782 (1963).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1 to .11 (Supp. 1962).
3. 201 Pa. Super. at 556, 193 A.2d at 782.
4, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351 (1962).
5. 201 Pa. Super. at 556, 193 A.2d at 782.

6.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 28, § 307.5 (Supp. 1962).

7. 201 Pa. Super. at 558, 193 A.2d at 783.
8. Pa. Laws 1951, act 402.
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to the problem of determining paternity of children born during wedlock?
To put the act of 1961 and the Weston decision into proper perspective, it is
necessary to review the history of the presumption of legitimacy relating to
a child born during wedlock and to analyze the interpretation placed upon
the act of 1951.
It should be noted that the presumption of legitimacy took roots before
science could develop a sound method with which to determine parenthood,
and this, according to superior court Judge Woodside,' ° was a reason for
the presumption's strength. At common law a child born during wedlock was
conclusively presumed legitimate unless the husband was "outside the four
seas which bounded the kingdom."'" The distance required was later shortened
to that which made access very improbable. If the husband had access, only
his absolute impotence could bastardize the wife's issue. The term "access"
was eventually defined to mean sexual intercourse, not merely visitation with
the spouse.12 However, ruling law declares that the presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing proof of facts establishing nonaccess, impotence,
or lack of sexual intercourse.13 But as was pointed out in Weston 14 both the
husband and wife are denied the right to testify to nonaccess. Therefore, an
insurmountable burden has often been imposed on challengers.
In Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed the act of 1951 and by a four-to-three decision determined
that the blood test was to be available only in prosecutions for fornication
and bastardy or neglect to support a bastard. The majority based its decision
upon a construction of the statutory words "proceeding to establish paternity."' 6 The court reasoned that the legislature intended these words to
extend the right only to a man accused of fathering the child of an unwed
mother. The law presumes the paternity of a child. The theory was that since
the law presumes the paternity of a child born during wedlock, paternity was
thereby established, and the presumed father could not avail himself of the
statute to disprove parenthood. The court pointed out, "It is true that the
present proceeding is one in which paternity is relevant or one in which
paternity has been controverted, or one in which paternity is an issue, but
9. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451 (1957).
10. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 199 Pa. Super. 274, 282, 184 A.2d
351, 354 (1962).
11. Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binney 283, 286 (1814).
12. Cairgle v. American Radiator and S.S. Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 255 A.2d 439 (1951).
13. 5 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Bastardy § 2 (1958).
14. 201 Pa. Super. at 556, 193 A.2d at 783.
15. 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451 (1957).
16. Pa. Laws 1951, act 402 provides: "In any proceeding to establish paternity, the
court, on motion of the defendant, shall order ... blood grouping tests . . " (Emphasis
added.)
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it is not a proceeding brought to establish paternity.' 17 Pennsylvania, contrary to other jurisdictions, i8 had not seen fit to allow blood testing in any
action in which paternity was relevant. The court looked to that portion of
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (not then adopted
in Pennsylvania) which provided that paternity need only be relevant to
the proceedings.' 9 The majority then concluded that the failure of the Pennsylvania legislature to place such liberal provisions in the act of 1951 indicated an intent not to allow bastardization of a child born during wedlock by
20
the use of blood tests.
A study of the O'Brien dissent 2 ' is now in order. It concluded that to hold
that a presumption can establish the fact of paternity "is not only to look upon
justice as blindfolded, but to blind her by law's own hand. ' 22 The presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable by clear evidence, and the scientific validity
of the use of blood-grouping tests to disprove paternity is not subject to
doubtY' The act of 1951 was intended to insure that a man "might not unjustly be made to support a child he had not fathered. ' 24 The dissent concluded that the policy was intended to include children born in wedlock. To
substantiate this interpretation the minority pointed out that the satute allowed
a blood test "In any proceeding" and defined the word "any" to mean without
limitation.2 5 The Statutory Construction Act was cited for the proposition
2
that a law should be liberally construed. 1
Judge Woodside, when the O'Brien case was before the superior court,
had dissented in support of the husband's request for the blood test.27 His
belief was that unless parenthood is shown in the first instance no obligation
for support exists. Furthermore, "there are scientific means which may conclusively decide the question. . . . Why should the courts suppress the truth ?,,28
The legislature apparently adopted the view of the dissenters, for in 1961
they repealed the 1951 act, enacting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity.2 9 The following provision establishes the authority to
administer the test:
17. 390 Pa. at 555, 136 A.2d at 453.
18. E.g., Doloff v.Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955); Cortese v. Cortese,
10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
19.

UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY §§

20. 390 Pa. at 557, 136 A.2d at 454 (1957).
21. Id. at 556, 136 A.2d at 454.
22. Id. at 559, 136 A.2d at 455.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 573, 136 A.2d at 462.
25. Id. at 568, 136 A.2d at 459.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
27. 182 Pa. Super. 584, 589, 128 A.2d 164, 167 (1956).
28. Id. at 592, 128 A.2d at 168.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1 to .11 (Supp. 1962).

1-11.
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In a civil action in which paternity, parentage, or identity of a child
is a relevant fact, the court upon its own initiative or upon suggestion
made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved may,
or upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not
to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and
alleged father to submit to blood tests.30
The majority in O'Brien, while ruling against the husband's claim, did state
that paternity was a relevant fact in a support action. This dicta in conjunction with the O'Brien minority support for the blood test request would
seem to indicate that the supreme court in 1957, had it been dealing with the
act of 1961, would have decided that the blood-test results were admissible.
The later cases have agreed that the act of 1961 clearly extends to the case
of a husband denying paternity in a support action.
Assuming a support action against a husband is within the purview of
the act, when does the statute entitle him to use the tests? When the statutory language is read as a whole, one could construe the wording to be
directory in one sense and discretionary in another. If the court thought a
blood test should be taken, the court without request could order the test.
Upon the suggestion of any party to the action the court could order the
test.31 But if a "party to the action" files a motion with the court and if the

proceedings are not in danger of undue delay, the court "shall order" the
blood test. In this latter instance the court has discretion only as to the determination of undue delay. It would seem that such a petition should almost
32
automatically result in a blood-test order.
Another portion of the act provides that "the presumption of legitimacy
of a child born during wedlock is overcome" by negative test results. 33 The
words "legitimacy of a child born during wedlock" unquestionably signify
that this section is applicable to a support action against a husband. The
words "presumption . . . is overcome" make it very clear that test results

rebut the strong presumption of legitimacy. No qualification is placed upon
this provision. Thus, in the Goldman case, 4 decided in September, 1962, the
majority of the court3 5 held the blood-test provision to be applicable to an
action brought against a husband for the support of children born during
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp. 1962).
31. It should be kept in mind the statute uses the word "may" in regard to testing
upon its own initiative or upon an informal suggestion.
32. One cannot help but wonder how the period of testing can prolong an action
unduly when in many cases such a test is the only real assurance of a just result.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 307.5 (Supp. 1962).
34. 199 Pa. Super. 274, 184 A.2d 351 (1962).
35. The court split four to two with one judge concurring.
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wedlock. 3 6 The decision was in part based upon the dictum of the majority in
O'Brien37 which interpreted the not then enacted Uniform Act.
However, the Weston decision has qualified the Goldman case by holding
that the husband may be denied the use of the tests through estoppel. Judge
Wright in his Weston dissent asserted that "parenthood by estoppel" was not
used in Goldman; therefore, how can the same majority assert its use now in
Weston?3 8 Comparison of the facts in both cases shows that the husband in
Goldman lived with his wife three months after the birth of a disputed child,3 9
while in Weston the huband lived with his wife at most three years, six months
after the birth of the oldest disputed child.40 It must be concluded, therefore,
that "parenthood by estoppel" lies somewhere between the Goldman three
months and the Weston three years, six months. In Goldman, the majority
did state that they disliked giving a husband free license to question the
paternity of his wife's children ;41 the Weston situation gave the court an
opportunity to restrict the scope of the earlier decision. Dictum in Goldman introduced the theory of "parenthood by estoppel" by analogizing it
to "adoption by estoppel," where a parent to an adoption is estopped from
later questioning its legality. 42 The court queried, if estoppel is applicable to
adoption, why not to a wife's natural born? However, there is a distinction.
In the adoption situation the adoptive parent knows that the child is not his;
but when a child is born to a man's wife, it is probable the man does not
know the child is not his. Should the law penalize a trusting husband? Surely
the husband should not be estopped where he did not know or have any
reason to know of his wife's unfaithful conduct. 43 Of course, there is the
possibility that a court might feel that to determine whether a husband were
aware of his wife's infidelity might unduly lengthen the proceedings. To substantiate their holding of "parenthood by estoppel," the Weston majority
included some other statements that are cause for discussion. The court said
it is "inherently repulsive" for a man to wait until he and his wife have personal differences before he raises the question of paternity. 44 Suppose the
personal differences occur when an unsuspecting husband finds his wife in
a compromising situation. The court stated that pricking the child's skin
30. 199 Pa. Super. at 276, 184 A.2d at 351.
37. 390 Pa. 551, 556, 136 A.2d 451, 453 (1957).
38. 201 Pa. Super. at 559, 193 A.2d at 784.
39. 199 Pa. Super. at 276, 184 A.2d at 351.
40. 201 Pa. Super. at 555, 193 A.2d at 782.
41. 199 Pa. Super. at 282, 184 A.2d at 355.
42. Id. at 283, 184 A.2d at 356.
43. The Weston opinion does not indicate whether the husband harbored the suspicions which led to his request for a blood test during the time he supported and
accepted them.
44. 201 Pa. Super. at 556, 193 A.2d at 783.
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leaves an indelible mark of doubt on his mind. 45 Small children, however, are
familiar with the irritation of submitting to doctors' inoculations and injections
for various purposes. Can a small child distinguish a blood test from the usual
injection? A child too young will be no worse for wear if the test proves
nothing; in most cases the child would be too young. The court also asserted
that defendants should not be given a vehicle with which they can embarrass
a wife and child in the heat of support actions. 46 But if the legislature has
deemed use of the tests justifiable, the courts should honor that decision.
Judge Montgomery in a concurring opinion in Weston reasserted the fear
voiced in his Goldman dissent that the flood-gates of litigation are being
opened by a broad interpretation of the act of 1961. 4 7 Blood tests clearly could
be employed outside a support hearing. Disregarding the Weston elements
of estoppel for the moment, if a husband bastardizes a child born during
wedlock by use of the blood test, can he then use this proceeding to establish
adultery for divorce? There seems no reason why he cannot except possibly
for the requirements of that cause of action itself.48 The test could also be
used to support an annulment action based on fraudulent representation of
parenthood where alleged paternity is used as an inducement for marriage.
The act of 1961 might be used to substantiate or negate a claim against an
estate, or to help decide a contention that a parent deserted a child.
Judge Montgomery's concern over a possible flood of litigation has merit,
but should it be feared? The legislature with the act of 1951 provided for
blood tests where an unwed mother charged a man with parenthood, and if
this were all the legislature sought to provide, the act of 1961 would not exist
today. The intent was to allow a greater use of the blood tests. Therefore,
although a flood is feared, it appears to have been intended. Must Pennsylvania adhere to outmoded thoughts about the family situation? The legislature
surely considered the sanctity of the family when it allowed the presumption
of legitimacy to be overthrown. Society is becoming sophisticated, and the
blood test is another outgrowth of this sophistication. Therefore, the Weston
court's limitation on the application of blood tests seems to disregard legislative intent.
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock has been
reduced, but one cannot be sure how much. It would seem the court should
have allowed the test and thereby prevented constant future litigation as to
45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 558, 193 A.2d at 784.
48. The courts may limit admissible evidence to proof of adulterous inclination or
disposition at the time the act is alleged to occur and an opportunity to satisfy the
inclination or disposition. See Pierpoint v. Pierpoint, 108 Pa. Super. 108, 164 Atl. 808
(1933).
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when it can be used. As Justice Woodside once said, "Why should the petitioner or the Commonwealth fear to know the truth ?"49
JEROME

B.

FRANK

49. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 182 Pa. Super. 584, 589, 128 A.2d 164,

167 (1956).

MISREPRESENTATIONS ON INSURANCE APPLICATIONS:
WHEN IS FRAUDULENT INTENT A JURY QUESTION?
In Raymond P. Shafer Trustees v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.1
a familiar problem was before the Pennsylvania supreme court. The
question presented involved the availability of the defense of fraud in the
procurement of life insurance, to avoid liability on the contract. After a
jury trial resulting in a verdict for the insurer, the insured alleged prejudicial
error at the trial level. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sitting en
banc denied the motion for new trial without consideration by concluding that
defendant-insurer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; that is, a
2
directed verdict would have been proper.
Defendant delivered a policy to plaintiff in April, 1956. On May 23, 1957,
plaintiff was killed as a result of an automobile accident. The trustees of an
insurance trust for decedent's beneficiaries requested payment of the policy,
but the insurer denied liability on the ground that false and fraudulent answers
had been given to the company's medical examiner during an examination
required as part of the application process. The trustees brought an action in
assumpsit to recover the proceeds. 8 At trial defendants established that contrary to the statements made to their examiner, the insured was hospitalized
within the five years preceding the date of application, he was examined
and treated by physicians during the same period, he was informed his blood
pressure was elevated, and he had electrocardiograms and X-rays taken during
this period. 4 The supreme court found the defendant-insurer established
by unimpeached evidence that the statements made by the insured in the
application were material to the risk insured against 5 and were falsely and
fraudulently made by the insured. 6
The supreme court was only concerned with the narrow question of
whether or not the Shafer case was rightly ruled on as a matter of law in the
trial court. The fact, however, that the court was split five to two in applying
what should be well-settled law in Pennsylvania, is justification for a consideration of the law regarding misrepresentations made in an application for
life insurance.
Fundamental to any discussion of misrepresentations in insurance law is
the distinction between warranties and representations. A representation is a
statement collateral to the risk made as an inducement to bring a contract
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

410 Pa. 394, 189 A.2d 234 (1963).
Id. at 395, 189 A.2d 235.
Ibid.
Id. at 397, 189 A.2d at 235.
Id. at 400, 189 A.2d at 237.
Id. at 399, 189 A.2d at 236.
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into being: a warranty, on the other hand, is a contractual obligation, a part
of the completed contract. 7 It is evident from these definitions that where
an insured has warranted the truthfulness of his statements, any divergence
from literal truth is sufficient to permit the insurer to avoid the policy.
The harshness of the warranty doctrine became apparent at an early date
and the General Assembly of Pennsylvania took legislative action to remedy
its effect. The first link in the legislative chain was forged in 1885. An act 8
provided that life insurance policies were not to be forfeited due to false
statements made by an applicant if such statements were immaterial to the
risk and innocently made. The 1885 legislation was repealed by the Insurance
Act of 19119 but reenacted in 1921 in the Health and Insurance Act.' 0 Today
the warranty or representation issue is resolved by an act passed in 1937.
This act provides:
All statements made by the applicant for an annuity or pure endowment contract, or statements made by the insured or in his behalf in
the negotiation for a policy or certificate of life, endowment, accident
or health insurance . . . shall be deemed . . . to be representa-

tions and not warranties. 1
Another statute provides that life insurance policies must contain a
clause making them incontestable two years after their issuance. 12 The
clause estops the insurer from denying liability after the period has elapsed.' 3
In the instant case, the controversy arose within two years after the date of
issue, consequently estoppel by virtue of the incontestability clause was not
possible. "[T]he two year provision of the incontestability clause cannot be
14
shortened or tolled by the death of the insured within that period."'
7. See Karp v. Fidelity-PhoenixFire Ins. Co., 134 Pa. Super. 514, 4A.2d 529 (1939),
wherein the court stated:
A warranty in an insurance policy is a contract relating to an existing fact
and . . . it differs from a representation in that it is a binding agreement
that the fact is as warranted, while a representation is not an agreement . . .
but such a statement of it as will constitute as misrepresentation if it be untrue.
Id. at 517, 4 A.2d at 531. See generally APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7341,

at 440 (1943).
8. Act of June 23, 1885, P.L. 134. The following applied the act: Rigley v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 240 Pa. 332, 87 At. 428 (1914); Keatley v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 197, 40 Atl. 808 (1898) ; March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186
Pa. 629, 40 Atl. 1100 (1896).
9. Act of March 30, 1911, P.L. 34.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 341 (1958).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 512(a) (1958).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 510(c) (1958). The act provides:
No policy of life . . . insurance . . . shall hereafter be delivered in this Conmmonwealth unless it contains . . . (c) a provision that the policy shall be
incontestable after it has been in force, during the lifetime of the insured, two
years from its date of issue . . ..
13. Feierman v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 507, 124 Ati. 171 (1924).
14. Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 Pa. Super. 314, 320, 171 Ati. 106,

108 (1934).
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When the representations and incontestability provisions are considered
together, it is apparent that they place the insured and his beneficiaries in
a very favored position. Perhaps this favoritism is an outgrowth of the insurance concept itself. If social justice is the philosophy underlying the concept
and spreading the risk and reaching deeper pockets are the primary purposes of
insurance, as is suggested by workmen's compensation acts, a protective
attitude can be understood. 15 Often, the beneficiary is a widow or minor
child. On the other hand, if life insurance is viewed as serving a different
function, such as that of providing wise business investments or convenient
means for increasing the size of estates, 16 one might criticize the wisdom of
statutes and decisional law which confer a favored position upon a litigant
who has not been truthful in the application process.
Although estoppel could not be argued by virtue of the incontestability
clause in the Shafer case, it was argued on another theory. The plaintiffs
contended that the insurer had a duty to investigate the health of the
insured before issuing the policy; and not having done so, the insurer should
be estopped from raising the defense of fraud. The court discounted this
assertion, stating that no such duty was imposed on the facts of the case
because the company had every right to rely upon insured's statements which
"indicated no such investigation was necessary. '17 Had the questions in
the policy been answered ambiguously or evasively the insurer might have been
18
under a duty to get more information.
In Evans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co."' the supreme court reviewed

dozens of prior cases and clearly stated the bounds of the law regarding false
statements made in insurance applications. Evans was a suit for the proceeds
of a life insurance policy. The insurer denied liability alleging fraud in the
procurement of the contract. The court declared that where false statements
are deemed representations, they can only be grounds for avoidance of liability
by the insurer if they are made with an intent to deceive.20 Whether the
representations were made with an intent to defraud depends upon the
existence of good faith on the part of the applicant in making the statements.
The court emphasized that ordinarily the issue of an applicant's good faith
is to be submitted to a jury for determination. In fact, the Evans case required
the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation to be submitted to a jury in all
situations other than those where defendant-insurer presents uncontradicted
15. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20, at 5 (1952).
16. 1 GOLDIN, INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 6, at 4 (2d ed. 1946).
17. 410 Pa. at 400, 189 A.2d at 237.
18. Lebanon Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 106 Pa. 28 (1884); Meyers v. Lebanon
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 156 Pa. 420, 27 Atl. 39 (1893).
19. 322 Pa. 547, 186 Atl. 133 (1936).
20. Id. at 550, 186 At. 136.
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documentary evidence, or where plaintiff sabotages his own case by admissions
in his pleadings, or by unfavorable testimony from his own witnesses.
The statement of the law presented in the Evans case has been repeatedly
applied in subsequent cases.21 A consideration of the cases applying these
principles illustrates the difficulty of deciding whether a case should be
submitted to the jury or whether it should be ruled upon as a matter of
law. 22 The instant case clearly demonstrates the difficulty involved. Both
the majority 23 and the dissent 24 in the Shafer opinion found the Evans case
authority for their positions.
In beginning its analysis in Shafer, the court noted the burden is upon
the defendant-insurer to establish that the insured's statements were material
to the risk and that they were falsely and fraudulently made ;25 the court
then discussed the doctrine of presumptive fraud. 26 A statement is presump27
tively fraudulent when made by an applicant with knowledge of its falsity.
But in Pennsylvania a presumption is said to disappear and the case to stand
28
upon its facts when evidence is offered contrary to the presumption.
Based upon the operation of this rule, plaintiff's evidence that the insured had
made these statements mistakenly or inadvertently2 9 should have overcome
the presumption of fraud. However, this conclusion was rejected by the
majority.
21. Five principles of law were announced by the court in Evans:
(1) Where the statements made by insured in the application are warranted
by him to be true, or where the policy expressly provides for its avoidance
by the falsity of such statements, the insurer may avoid the policy by showing
the falsity of statements material to the risk, irrespective of insured's knowledge
of their falsity or of his good faith in making them. (2) Where the statements
are made representations, the insurer, to avoid the policy, must show they were
false and insured knew they were false or otherwise acted in bad faith in making
them. (3) If such falsity and requisite bad faith affirmatively appear (a) from
competent and uncontradicted documentary evidence, such as hospital records,
proofs of death, or admissions in the pleadings, or (b) from the uncontradicted
testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses, a verdict may be directed for the insurer.
(4) But whenever disputed questions of fact are presented by conflicting evidence,
whether documentary or oral, or whenever the insurer's defense depends upon
the testimony of its witnesses, even though such testimony is uncontradicted, the
case must be submitted to the jury, subject to the trial courts' power to award a
new trial . . . . (5) When the suit is in equity, the chancellor is the sole trier of
fact, and submission to a jury is not required except where he deems it advisable.
Id. at 560, 186 Atl. 141.
22. E.g., De Bellis v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 372 Pa. 207, 210, 93 A.2d
429, 430 (1952); Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 342 Pa. 404, 408,
21 A.2d 81, 84 (1941) ; Walsh v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 164 Pa. Super. 184,
188, 63 A.2d 472, 474 (1948).
23. 410 Pa. at 398, 189 A.2d at 236.
24. Id. at 401, 189 A.2d at 237.
25. Id. at 398, 189 A.2d at 236.
26. Ibid.
27. Kizrian v. United States Life Ins. Co., 383 Pa. 515, 119 A.2d 47 (1956).
28. Watkins v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934).
29. 410 Pa. at 397, 189 A.2d at 236.

1963]

RECENT CASES

101

How can it now be reasonably asserted that the insured through
inadvertence forgot or innocently overlooked his frequent examinations, consultations and treatments by physicians within a relatively
short period of time before making and executing the application for
insurance? How could he have innocently overlooked, or considered
of such little significance that it should not be disclosed, his hospitalization, . . . X-rays and electrocardiograms? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Even if it be conceded that the insured had no
indication of any serious illness, he was bound to know and remember
substantially all of the medical treatment, hospitalization, X-rays
and electrocardiograms.3 0
The cases of Anastasia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 81 and Reeder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.8 2 were cited as authority for the last stated principle.
Both confirm the court's position that medical examination, treatment, and
hospital confinement are material to the risk; and that the insurer is entitled
to an apprisal of these events before assuming the risk. And in the Evans
opinion the court stated:
The circumstances preceding and attending the making of the
statements may be such that . . . an inference of fraud is otherwise
irresistible, as for instance where an unreported illness or disability
of insured was so serious and so recent that he could not have
forgotten it.33
Uncontradicted the defendant's evidence in Shafer, consisting of hospital
records, doctors' records, and certain admissions in the pleadings,84 would
entitle the defendant to a directed verdict.3 5 However, plaintiff's case indicated
that the insured was a vigorous, hard working individual who enjoyed excellent health during the two years prior to his application. Furthermore,
plaintiff offered an explanation that the insured's hospital confinements were
for trivial ailments and that at no time did the insured have knowledge that
he was the victim of any serious health problem.3 6 Here again reference to
Evans is significant as the court there stated, "hospital records, may be contradicted or explained, and the disputed issues thus raised are for the con'8 7
sideration of the jury.
In the Shafer case Justice Cohen submitted a dissenting opinion criticizing
the propriety of the majority's decision to rule for the insurer as a matter of
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 399, 189 A.2d at 237.
149 Pa. Super. 414, 27 A.2d 510 (1942).
340 Pa. 503, 17 A.2d 879 (1941).
Evans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 553, 554, 186 At!. 138 (1936).
410 Pa. at 399, 189 A.2d at 236.
Evans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 560, 186 At. 133, 141 (1936).
410 Pa. at 397, 189 A.2d at 236.
322 Pa. at 556, 186 At!. at 140.
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law. 8s He based his dissent upon the recent case of Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Stinger,9 wherein the insurer alleged fraud on the part of the insured and
disclaimed liability on an accident policy. The insurer based its allegation upon
a negative answer to an inquiry whether insured's driver's license had been
suspended, revoked, or refused within two years of the application for
insurance.4 0 In fact, the insured's license had been revoked for two months
during this period; he was incompetent to drive.4 ' The court in Allstate agreed
that the false statement of insured was material to the risk and that it was
knowingly false when made. However, it was held that such facts must
combine with an intent to defraud to establish bad faith. 42 The Shafer dissent
pointed out that based upon the facts in Allstate no intent to defraud was
shown.43 Therefore, the argument has substance that a ruling as a matter of
law is not warranted merely from a showing that a false answer was knowingly
made in an insurance application. The dissenter drew further support for
his position by alluding to the facts in the Evans case. He pointed out that the
insured in Evans had knowingly concealed, when he applied for insurance,
a dislocated vertebra which ultimately led to his death. The ultimate disposition of the Evans case was that the good faith of the insured was an issue for
the jury. 44 Another case utilized by Justice Cohen to strengthen his position
was Adams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 45 In the Adams case the insured
knowingly concealed that she had consulted a doctor fifteen times within three
months of the application date; nevertheless, the court presented the facts
to the jury for determination of the applicant's good faith.
The position of the dissent in the Shafer case has merit. As long as the
policy of the law is to favor the insured or his beneficiaries in litigation, the
court should apply this policy consistently and put issues such as those in
Shafer before a jury.
LEE A. MONTGOMERY
38. 410 Pa. at 400, 189 A.2d at 237. (Mr. Justice Musmanno also dissented but
did not submit an opinion.)
39. 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960).
40. Id. at 535, 163 A.2d at 75.
41. The insured's incompetence resulted from his confinement in a mental hospital
between January and April of 1956. Upon certification by the hospital that he was
competent to drive his license was restored. Ibid.
42. Id. at 540, 163 A.2d at 78.
43. 410 Pa. at 401, 189 A.2d at 237.
44. 322 Pa. at 563, 186 Atl. at 143.
45. 322 Pa. 564, 186 Atl. 144 (1936).

